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WICKLINE v. STATE: THE EMERGING LIABILITY OF
THIRD PARTY HEALTH CARE PAYORS
Modern medicine is experiencing a tension that revolves around
the need for quality medical care and the concurrent problem of
the rising cost of medical services. Third party payors are being
pressured by California courts to provide carefully designed bene-fit programs that allow physicians to make quality health care
decisions without having to worry about the payment source of
additional costs. This Comment assesses the effect of third party
payor liability for poor health care - does its cost outweigh its
benefit?
INTRODUCTION
Nearly half of all physicians feel pressured to release Medicare'
patients early.2 This pressure results from a tension in medicine to-
day, the stress between the quality of medical care and medical eco-
nomics. Americans believe that the ability to pay should never create
a barrier to essential medical care, yet skyrocketing medical costs
make financial considerations an integral part of medical treatment
decisions.3
On opposing sides of this conflict are the patient and the third
party health care payor. The patient expects to receive the best med-
ical care available, while the third party payor wishes to limit cover-
age to essential medical services.4 Until now, physicians have been
caught in the middle. Exceeding the scope of the third party payor's
treatment authorization may result in nonpayment. Failure to meet
or exceed the standard of care may result in a malpractice suit. Phy-
sicians consequently may be forced to provide treatment without
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. 29 AM. MED. NEWS 17 (1986). Out of 1000 physicians randomly surveyed by
the American Medical Association, 48% felt "unduly pressured" to release Medicare
patients prematurely because of reimbursement concerns. Twenty-eight percent felt no
pressure, and the remaining 25% either were unsure or did not respond to the survey. See
also San Diego Union, Dec. 5, 1986, at A-13, col. I.
3. See generally Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Le-
gal, & Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1345 (1981).
4. See infra note 22.
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hope of payment.5
This tension recently reached a peak in a California case,
Wickline v. State." The court, considering the position of the physi-
cian caught between patient and third party payor, addressed for the
first time potential third party payor liability for negligent treatment
authorization decisions.7
To appreciate the implications of Wickline, a general understand-
ing of medical cost containment strategies is essential. This Com-
ment will review methods of medical cost control employed by third
party payors, present the factual background and holding of Wic-
kline, address the issue of governmental tort immunity as applied to
public health care payors, and discuss the impact of Wickline on
third party payors and health care providers respectively. The con-
clusion suggests that the ultimate costs of third party payor liability
may outweigh the benefits.
BACKGROUND
In 1965, Congress created Medicare' to provide mainstream medi-
cal care to the elderly on a national level. In the same year, Congress
made federal assistance available under Medicaid to states establish-
ing medical care programs for low-income individuals.9 California's
program under Medicaid is called Medi-Cal.10
Initially, both Medicare and Medi-Cal relied on retrospective util-
ization review for payment of claims and cost containment.1" Under
a retrospective system, the third party payor reimburses the health
care provider's reasonable cost of treatment after the treatment is
rendered. 12 Regardless of whether the third party payor ultimately
approves or denies the claim for treatment, the patient is assured
access to necessary health care.13
Unfortunately, retrospective utilization review proved economi-
cally disastrous. Because claims rarely were denied, an incentive ex-
isted for health care providers to overtreat in order to maximize
profits. 4 The problem was compounded further by the combined ef-
fects of soaring medical costs and increased demand for health care
5. See infra note 23.
6. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986).
7. Id. at 1190, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
9. Id.
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14081-14087.45 (West Supp. 1987).
11. California Dep't of Health Services, Peer Grouping Hospitals for Medi-Cal
Inpatient Reimbursement Purposes 3 (Jan. 1983) [hereinafter Peer Grouping Hospitals].
12. Id.
13. Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the California Medical Association in Sup-
port of Respondent at 2, Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1986) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief, Respondent].
14. Id. at 9. See Peer Grouping Hospitals, supra note 11, at 12.
1024
[VOL 24: 1023. 1987] Liability of Health Care Payors
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
services.1 5 By the early 1970s, cost projections under the existing ret-
rospective review system threatened enormous budget overruns and
the ultimate demise of government-funded health care programs.,,
In response to this crisis, legislatures abandoned retrospective utiliza-
tion review in favor of prospective utilization review. 17 Unlike retro-
spective review, where a claim for treatment is reviewed after the
fact, prospective review requires that a health care provider obtain
authorization from the third party payor before initiating treat-
ment. 18
Prospective utilization review is an effective cost containment
mechanism. Because only pre-authorized treatment is paid for,
health care providers have no incentive to overtreat in hopes of in-
creased compensation. Rather, they constantly are reminded that
when they exceed the pre-authorized scope of treatment, they very
likely are working for free. 9
Prospective review has restructured medical decisionmaking. Tra-
ditionally, medical treatment decisions involved only two parties, the
physician and the patient.20 Under prospective review, the third
party payor now plays an active role in determining both the course
and scope of treatment.2 For the first time, the "final say" in the
medical decisionmaking process is placed beyond the control of both
the physician and the patient.
The goals of the patient and the third party payor are opposite.
The patient is concerned with receiving the highest quality health
care available, and the third party payor primarily is concerned with
the efficient administration of limited funds. Both public and private
third party payors must ensure that health care dollars provide es-
sential treatment for many, rather than excessive treatment for few.
Third party payors seek to limit individual treatment to the essential
minimum. 22 By fostering these opposing goals, cost containment pro-
15. Peer Grouping Hospitals, supra note 11, at 12. See also Gibson & Waldo,National Health Expenditures, 1980, 3 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 48-52 (1981).
16. Id. See also Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medi-
care Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1985).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c, 1395x(k) (1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405, 456, 466, 473(1986); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14133 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
18. See Amicus Curiae Brief, Respondent, supra note 13, at 4.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id.
22. See generally Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Cost Care, Inc. in Support ofAppellant, Wickline v. State 183 Cal App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986) [herein-
after Amicus Curiae Brief, Appellant].
1025
grams such as prospective utilization review have created a tension
in medicine, with the physician caught in the middle. If the physi-
cian withholds essential treatment because the third party payor re-
fuses authorization, he may be sued by the patient for failure to con-
form to the standard of care. If the physician provides the unautho-
rized treatment, he runs the risk of nonpayment. No longer given the
final authoritative say in treatment decisions, the physician must bal-
ance the competing interests of the patient and the third party
payor, and try to avoid both the courtroom and the poorhouse in the
process. 23 This tension is the focus of Wickline v. State.
24
WICKLINE V. STATE
In 1976, Lois Wickline, a Medi-Cal recipient, underwent surgery
for a condition known as Leriche's Syndrome. 5 Wickline's recovery
was "stormy," and post-surgical complications necessitated several
subsequent operations. Because Wickline was a Medi-Cal recipient,
her physicians obtained pre-authorization for surgery and ten days of
post-surgical hospitalization. On the ninth day of hospitalization,
Wickline's surgeon concluded that, due to the post-surgical compli-
cations, an eight day extension of hospitalization was necessary. 28
A request for eight additional days of hospitalization was submit-
ted to Medi-Cal through proper channels and ultimately was consid-
ered by a Medi-Cal consultant.27 In an arguably negligent decision,
rendered without consulting a specialist, the Medi-Cal consultant ap-
proved only a four day extension of hospitalization for Wickline,
rather than the eight days requested. 28 Accordingly, Wickline's phy-
23. Amicus Curiae Brief, Respondent, supra note 13, at 4. See generally Note,
supra note 16.
24. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986).
25. Id. at 1179, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64. See also DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATIVE
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1293 (26th ed. 1985). Leriche's Syndrome is an arteriosclerotic
obstruction of the abdmoninal aorta, a portion of the main artery of the body that sup-
plies blood to the lower extremities. In Ms. Wickline's case, it was necessary to remove
the blocked portion of the aorta and replace it with a synthetic graft.
26. Wickline, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1181, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 665. Repeated post-
surgical clotting of the synthetic graft threatened the circulation in Ms. Wickline's right
leg, and necessitated further surgery and hospital monitoring.
27. Id. The request for additional hospitalization initially was considered by a
Medi-Cal "on-site" nurse, who reviewed the request form at Ms. Wickline's hospital.
The authority of Medi-Cal on-site nurses is limited to approval of requests. If the nurse
is unable to approve additional hospital time, he or she must contact a Medi-Cal consult-
ant, a licensed physician employed by Medi-Cal, to make the final decision on the re-
quest. In the instant case, the Medi-Cal on-site nurse was unable to approve the request
and telephoned a Medi-Cal consultant for the final decision. See Amicus Curiae Brief,
Respondent, supra note 13, at 26.
28. Wickline, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1183, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 666. The Medi-Cal
consultant based his decision upon the lack of information regarding Ms. Wickline's tem-
perature, diet, and bowel sounds, which he assumed were all normal. Respondent argued
that these parameters were of only tangential significance to the central problem of the
1026
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sicians released her from the hospital at the end of four days. Her
complications persisted at home, and delay in diagnosis and treat-
ment ultimately required the amputation of her right leg.2Wickline brought suit against the state for negligent discontinu-
ance of her Medi-Cal eligibility. At trial, Wickline's treating physi-
cians testified that the decision to release her at the end of four days
complied with the standard of care. They also stated, however, that
had she remained in the hospital for the requested eight days, her
leg probably could have been saved.30
A physician consultant for Medi-Cal testified on behalf of the
state. The consultant stated that if Wickline's physicians had deter-
mined that her release after four days was unwise, they could haveprocured an authorized extension of hospitalization by a simplephone call and explanation to the Medi-Cal consultant. Wickline's
treating physicians concurred with this view, and admitted they
would have called Medi-Cal and obtained an extension had they felt
any danger existed in discharging Wickline after four days."
The jury found the state liable for Wickline's injury, and the state
appealed. The appellate court reversed the judgment, and absolved
the state from liability as a matter of law, holding that a physician
bears the ultimate responsibility for treatment decisions. The court
reasoned that because the treating physician is in the best position todetermine the medical needs of the patient, the third party payor
relies upon the physician's input in making pre-authorization deci-
sions. The court found that the decision to discharge Wickline was
arrived at independently by her treating physicians, who were aware
that a phone call to Medi-Cal would have procured additional
hospitalization.32
reocclusion of Ms. Wickline's graft. The evidence also suggests that the consultant couldhave taken several steps to more fully apprise himself of Ms. Wickline's condition. Spe-cialists in peripheial vascular surgery, similar to Ms. Wickline's surgeon, were employedby Medi-Cal and made available to consultants for consultation in areas beyond theirimmediate expertise. The consultant in the instant case, although not a peripheral vascu-lar specialist, did not obtain such consultation prior to acting. The consultant also had
access to documentation of Ms. Wickline's initial hospitalization and surgery, but failedto review it prior to reducing the requested number of hospital days.29. Id. at 1186, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 668. Ms. Wickline's graft reoccluded at home,and, by the time she was rehospitalized, infection at the wound site made it medically
unsafe to relieve the obstruction by surgery.
30. Id. at 1178, 1187, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64, 669.31. Id. at 1190, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671. Appellant's Opening Brief at 29, Wickline
v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986) [hereinafter Appellant's
Brief].
32. Wickline, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1177, 1189, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663, 673.
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Although holding the physicians ultimately liable for Wickline's
injuries, the court also discussed the larger issue of third party payor
liability. The court suggested that, had Wickline's physicians asked
for an extension on the last day, and had Medi-Cal unreasonably
refused, liability for Wickline's injuries would have shifted to the
state.33 The court acknowledged the potential liability of third party
payors, stating:
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or
implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for example, when ap-
peals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily
ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.
3
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Discretionary v. Ministerial Acts
Although the issue of governmental tort immunity was raised by
the parties in Wickline,35 in the court's opinion it receives only brief
consideration. 6 Recognition of potential third party payor liability
implies that institutions such as Medi-Cal would not be protected by
government immunity. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of govern-
ment tort immunity serves to illustrate the function of the Medi-Cal
consultant and the potential immunity of government third party
payors.
The pivotal issue in governmental tort immunity involves charac-
terization of the contested act as either "ministerial" or "discretion-
ary." Government Code section 820.237 makes public employees im-
mune from the consequences of discretionary decisions. Government
Code section 815.2(b) 38 extends such immunity to the public entity
employing the employee.
The current test for characterizing acts as ministerial or discre-
tionary under Government Code section 820.2 was established in the
seminal case of Johnson v. State.39 Before Johnson, courts employed
33. Id. at 1190, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
34. Id.
35. Appellant's Brief, supra note 31, at 52; Respondent's Opening Brief at 40,
Wickline v. State, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986) [hereinafter Re-
spondent's Brief].
36. Wickline, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1188, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an
injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the
result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such dis-
cretion was abused.
38. CAL GOV'T CODE § 815.2(b) (West 1980) provides in pertinent part: "[A]
public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee
of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability."
39. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
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a mechanical, semantic approach in defining "discretionary" acts.40
The court in Johnson rejected this mechanical approach,4' favoring
instead a functional approach that focused on the underlying policy
reasons for granting immunity."2
The Johnson court held that the only valid purpose for granting
discretionary immunity was protection of the "separation of powers"
doctrine, and emphasized that courts must be sensitive to judicial
interference in policy decisions made by coordinate branches of gov-
ernment.4 3 The court suggested that the discretionary/ministerial di-
chotomy should be characterized as the difference between the
"planning" and "operational" levels of decisionmaking. Immunized
discretionary actions were identified as quasi-legislative policy mak-
ing decisions involving a deliberate balancing of risks and
advantages.44
In Johnson, a parole agent placed a juvenile parolee in a foster
40. A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, §
2.55, at 115 (2d ed. 1986). Prior to Johnson, courts struggled with a semantic definition
of discretionary, finding that nearly every act could be described as discretionary in some
regard: "[I]t would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even
if it only involved the driving of a nail." Ham v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App.
148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920).
41. Johnson, 69 Cal. 2d at 787, 447 P.2d at 356, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
42. Id. at 788, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
43. Id. at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248. The court stated:
Courts and commentators therefore have centered their attention on an assur-
ance of judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy
decisions has been committed to coordinate branches of government. Any
wider judicial review, we believe, would place the court in the unseemly posi-
tion of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordi-
nate branch of government. Moreover, the potentiality of such review might
even in the first instance affect the coordinate body's decision-making process.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 794, 447 P.2d at 360-61, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49. The court stated:
Our proposed distinction, sometimes described as that between the "planning"
and "operational" levels of decision-making, however, offers some basic guide-
posts, although it certainly presents no panacea. Admittedly, our interpretation
will necessitate delicate decisions; the very process of ascertaining whether an
official determination rises to the level of insulation from judicial review re-
quires sensitivity to the considerations that enter into it and an appreciation of
the limitations on the court's ability to reexamine it. Despite these potential
drawbacks, however, our approach possesses the dispositive virtue of concen-
trating on the reasons for granting immunity to the governmental entity. It
requires us to find and isolate those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making
which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not




home. Although he knew of the youth's violent tendencies, the parole
agent failed to warn the foster parents of any danger. When the
youth subsequently attacked and seriously injured the foster mother,
she sued the state for the parole agent's negligent failure to warn. 4"
Applying the above analysis, the court distinguished two types of
acts. First, the court found that the initial decision to parole the
youth required the careful balancing of potential risks and benefits.
The court concluded that because parole decisions require the resolu-
tion of policy considerations, these decisions qualify as discretionary
acts and are immune from judicial scrutiny.46 Second, the court
characterized the parole agent's decision not to warn the foster par-
ents as a nonimmunized ministerial act because it merely involved
the implementation of the overlying policy decision to parole.47
Characterizing the Medi-Cal Consultant's Decision as
Discretionary
Several arguments support characterization of the Medi-Cal con-
sultant's decision in Wickline as discretionary, and therefore immune
from liability. First, where a statutory scheme confers broad discre-
tionary powers upon a public employee, the employee is immune
under Government Code section 820.2.48
The basis for this argument lies in the statutory description of the
Medi-Cal consultant's duties. Welfare and Institutions Code section
14132 (b)49 provides that in-patient hospital services shall be subject
to utilization controls. Welfare and Institutions Code section
14133(a) 0 defines utilization controls as prior authorization of medi-
cal services rendered by a Health Department consultant based upon
a determination of medical necessity.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 14103.651 authorizes Medi-
Cal "on-site" nurses to approve, but not deny, requests for medical
services under the supervision of Medi-Cal consultants. Section
50009 of Title 22 of the California Administrative Code 52 defines
the term "Medi-Cal consultant," and sections 51159(a)"3 and
51003(a) 54 provide that the Medi-Cal consultant shall not only make
the initial pre-authorization decision, but also review the decision at
45. Id. at 784-85, 447 P.2d at 354, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
46. Id. at 795, 447 P.2d at 361, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
47. Id. at 795-96, 447 P.2d at 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
48. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 31, at 52.
49. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14132(b) (West Supp. 1987).
50. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14133(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). See infra
note 85.
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14103.6 (West Supp. 1987).
52. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 50009 (West 1986).
53. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 51159(a).
54. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 51003(a).
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the first level of appeal. Section 51327(a)(3) 55 provides that requests
for nonemergency hospitalization, such as occurred in Wickline, re-
quire prior authorization by a Medi-Cal consultant.
Under this statutory scheme, the pre-authorization decision of a
Medi-Cal consultant could be characterized as discretionary by defi-
nition. In determining the "medical necessity" of requested treat-
ment, the consultant not only balances the potential risks and bene-
fits in light of his or her independent medical judgment, but also
weighs considerations of the fair and efficient allocation of limited
funds for the public welfare. 6
Characterization of the consultant's decision as discretionary is
strengthened by comparison to decisions of the "on-site" nurse. Al-
though allowed to approve treatment requests based on medical eval-
uation, the nurse is prohibited from denying such requests, and must
defer to higher authority.57 The nurse's function could be character-
ized as ministerial because the exercise of judgment is strictly cir-
cumscribed and subject to external review. The limited scope of
choice suggests the "operational" level of decisionmaking, where the
nurse is limited to a one-way application of a pertinent rule.
The Medi-Cal consultant, by contrast, enjoys full power to author-
ize or refuse treatment requests, and is responsible for the first level
of appellate review of his or her own decisions.58 The consultant's
initial decision incorporates the first level of appellate review, with
the attendant consideration of conflicting policies. This decisional
process could be construed as rising to the "planning" level of gov-
ernment action and accordingly immunized from judicial review.
A second argument for immunizing the decisions of Medi-Cal
consultants is avoidance of frustration of legislative purpose.
59 Impo-
sition of tort liability could result in Medi-Cal consultants becoming
preoccupied with liability avoidance rather than efficient administra-
tion. This would contravene Medi-Cal's fundamental purpose of allo-
cating limited public funds in the fairest way possible."
0
55. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 51327(a)(3).
56. Appellant's Brief, supra note 31, at 58.
57. See supra notes 27 and 52 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59. Appellant's Brief, supra note 31, at 62-63.
60. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West Supp. 1987). But see Johnson, 69
Cal. 2d at 790, 447 P.2d at 358, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 246, where the court, in rejecting this
argument, held: "The danger that public employees will be insufficiently zealous in their
official duties does not serve as a basis for immunity in California." (emphasis in origi-
nal). The court reasoned that government employees were adequately indemnified
against personal liability by the state, and awareness of potential liability promoted the
1031
A third argument construes Government Code section 818.461 asbestowing discretionary immunity on Medi-Cal consultants. Theconsultant's decision could be characterized as an "approval" or "au-thorization" within the meaning of the statute.62 In Morris v.County of Matin, 3 the court defined ministerial acts as those whichcreate a mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6.4In Morris, the county was charged with a duty to ensure that ap-plicants for building permits had obtained worker's compensation in-surance. The county's failure to fulfill this statutory duty was held tobe a ministerial act, because obtaining proof of insurance was amandatory requirement rather than a discretionary decision."3The treatment authorization decisions of Medi-Cal consultants, bycontrast, involve no such mandatory duty. The decisions of theMedi-Cal "on-site" nurse, limited to either approval or deferral,seem more mandatory than those of the consultant, who is given un-limited authority with respect to decisionmaking.66 Thus, the treat-
ment authorization decisions of Medi-Cal consultants arguably couldqualify as discretionary acts under Government Code section 818.4.
Characterizing the Medi-Cal Consultant's Decision as Ministerial
Equally persuasive arguments support the characterization ofMedi-Cal consultants' decisions as purely ministerial. First, in negli-gence cases, liability is the rule and immunity the exception. 7 Whengovernmental immunity is raised as a defense, a presumption infavor of the injured plaintiff usually arises.6 8Second, Government Code section 855.669 imposes liability incases of medical examination or diagnosis for treatment purposes.The Medi-Cal consultant exercises independent medical judgment inreviewing treatment requests. These decisions therefore could beconstrued as medical examinations or diagnoses relative to treatment
exercise of care in the performance of official duties.61. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.4 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987) provides as follows:A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, sus-pension or revocation of, or by failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend orrevoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorizationwhere the public entity or an employee of the public entity is authorized byenactment to determine whether or not such authorization should be issued,denied, suspended or revoked.
62. Appellant's Brief, supra note 31, at 68.63. 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1977).64. Id. at 910, 559 P.2d at 612, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 257. See infra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.65. Morris, 18 Cal. 3d at 910, 559 P.2d at 612, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 257.66. See supra notes 27 and 54 and accompanying text.67. See Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967).68. Respondent's Brief, supra note 35, at 41.69. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 855.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
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of individual patients. If the consultant's decisions fall within section
855.6, tort immunity under Government Code sections 820.2 and
818.4 could be eliminated under the statutory construction canon
favoring specific statutory language over general.
Third, the case of Bohrer v. County of San Diego7" withholds dis-
cretionary immunity in the medical setting. In Bohrer, the alleged
negligent prescription of medication by a county physician resulted
in a mental patient's death. The court held that the physician's med-
ical decision did not rise to the policymaking level, and thus did not
justify the imposition of discretionary immunity under Government
Code section 820.2. If treatment authorization decisions of Medi-
Cal consultants are products of independent medical judgment, such
decisions may be denied discretionary immunity under both section
855.6 and Bohrer.7 2
A challenge to discretionary immunity under the statutory defini-
tion of the Medi-Cal consultant's role is a fourth approach. Adoption
of the prospective utlization review process by the Department of
Health Services could be characterized as a discretionary policy de-
cision, requiring protection from judicial scrutiny. Application of the
prospective review process in individual cases by the Medi-Cal con-
sultant, however, could be construed as a purely ministerial act.73
The consultant does not "make policy" by deciding which method of
utlization review to adopt, but merely applies the existing scheme at
the "operational" level.
The consultant's role in the patient's course of treatment is rela-
tively passive and could be considered a fifth basis for denial of dis-
cretionary immunity. The treating physician actively exercises his
medical judgment in selecting and requesting a specific course of
treatment for an individual patient. By contrast, the Medi-Cal con-
sultant passively reviews the treating physician's request for com-
pleteness and considers whether the request contains sufficient detail
to justify authorization. 4 The consultant's decision entails no bal-
ancing of conflicting policy considerations nor the exercise of inde-
pendent medical judgment.
A sixth argument would challenge discretionary immunity for a
Medi-Cal consultant under Government Code section 818.4, which
70. 104 Cal. App. 3d 155, 163 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1980).
71. Id. at 162, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
72. Amicus Curiae Brief, Respondent, supra note 13, at 21.
73. Id.
74. Respondent's Brief, supra note 35, at 43, 44.
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applies to government entities involved in licensing activities.75 Be-
cause section 818.4 could be interpreted to apply exclusively to li-
censing-type activities, it would not apply to prospective utilization
review in the medical setting.76
Seventh, a mandatory duty could be imposed on the state under
Morris.7 In Morris, the court construed Government Code section
815.6 7 to deny discretionary immunity where the state fails to fulfill
a mandatory duty imposed by statute.7 9 The court held that discre-
tionary immunity was not available as a defense for the county's fail-
ure to obtain proof of worker's compensation insurance as required
by Labor Code section 3800.80
When read together, Welfare and Institutions Code sections
14000,81 14133(a) 2 and 14133.183 impose a mandatory duty on
Medi-Cal to establish prospective review programs to ensure that
Medi-Cal beneficiaries receive adequate care.84 In Wickline, the fact
that Ms. Wickline did not receive adequate care under the prospec-
tive review system raises an inference of noncompliance by Medi-Cal
with this statutory duty. Under Government Code section 815.6 as
construed in Morris, Medi-Cal would be denied discretionary immu-
nity from the consequences of the consultant's decision.
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.4 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). See supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
76. Respondent's Brief, supra note 35, at 49. Authorization of medical treatment
does not fit within the meaning of "licensing activities" considered by cases construing
section 818.4, most of which involve issuance of licenses or permits. See A. VAN AL-
STYNE, supra note 40, at 149.
77. 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1977).
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987) provides as follows:
Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment
that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the
public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its fail-
ure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised
reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
79. Morris, 18 Cal. 3d at 915-16, 559 P.2d at 615-16, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61.
80. Id. at 910-11, 559 P.2d at 612, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 257. See CAL. LAB. CODE §
3800 (West 1971).
81. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West Supp. 1987) provides in pertinent
part that Medi-Cal recipients should be able "whenever possible and feasible . . . to
secure health care in the same manner employed by the public generally, and without
discrimination or segregation based purely on their economic disability."
82. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14133 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987) provides in
pertinent part:
Utilization controls that may be applied to the services set forth in Section
14132 which are subject to utilization control shall be limited to:
(a) Prior authorization, which is approval by a department consultant, of a
specified service in advance of the rendering of that service based upon a deter-
mination of medical necessity.
83. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14133.1 (West Supp. 1987) provides in pertinent
part: "[E]ach utilization control shall be reasonably related to the purpose for which it is
imposed."
84. Amicus Curiae Brief, Respondent, supra note 13, at 26.
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The foregoing arguments highlight the complexity and importance
of the issues involved in determining the existence of discretionary
immunity. On balance, the Medi-Cal consultants' treatment authori-
zation decisions do not appear realistically to be the product of a
quasi-legislative balancing of conflicting policy considerations.85 The
consultants' decisional process seems closer to the "operational" than
the "planning" level, and appears simply to involve the application of
the approved method of utilization review. 6
THE EFFECT OF LIABILITY ON THIRD PARTY PAYORS
Protection Under MICRA
If third party payors are exposed to medical liability, they should
be treated no differently from other health care defendants. Appar-
ently, however, the statutory protection currently afforded medical
malpractice defendants may be unavailable to third party payors. In
1975 the California legislature enacted the Medical Injury Compen-
sation Reform Act (MICRA)8 7 in response to a perceived medical
malpractice crisis. The purpose of MICRA is to ensure the contin-
ued availability of medical liability insurance through reduction of
malpractice awards and attorney's fees.88
MICRA creates four exceptions to traditional tort recovery princi-
ples in medical malpractice actions. First, California Civil Code sec-
tion 3333.1 abrogates the collateral source rule and allows introduc-
tion of any collateral benefits paid to plaintiffs.89 Second, California
Civil Code section 3333.2 placed a $250,000 limit on recovery of
noneconomic damages in a single action.9" Third, California Civil
Procedure Code section 677.7 creates an exception to the rule requir-
85. See supra note 44.
86. See Amicus Curiae Brief, Respondent, supra note 13, at 13.
87. Ch. 1, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 3949.
88. The preamble to MICRA, ch. 2, § 12.5, 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Ex. Sess. 40007
provides in pertinent part:
The legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the
State of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and
resulting in a potential breakdown of the health delivery system, severe hard-
ships for the medically indigent, a denial of access for the economically margi-
nal, and depletion of physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of
health care available to citizens of this state.
But see Comment, California's MICRA: The Need for Legislative Reform, 23 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 171, 184 (1986) (questioning the reality of the perceived malpractice insur-
ance crisis).
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1987).
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1987).
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ing lump sum payments of judgment awards.9 1 Fourth, California
Business and Professions Code section 6146 places a sliding scale
restriction on the recovery of contingent fees by plaintiffs'
attorneys.9
The provisions of MICRA apply only to actions for injury or dam-
age against "health care providers." The common definition of
"health care provider" used throughout MICRA refers to appropri-
ately licensed individuals or health care facilities.93 Third party
payors of health care services are not mentioned. Third party payors
do not logically qualify as "health care providers." Third party
payors do not "provide" health care; they pay for it. A treatment
authorization decision of a third party payor, although capable of
influencing the scope of treatment, does not logically constitute "pro-
vision" of treatment under any interpretation.
Third party payors probably were excluded from protection under
MICRA because the drafters did not envision third party payor lia-
bility. In the absence of specific legislative action to the contrary,
third party payors must bear the inequity of sharing liability while
denied the statutory protection afforded other medical malpractice
defendants.
Other Statutory Inconsistencies
MICRA is not the only legislation under which "health care prov-
iders" receive special treatment. California Code of Civil Procedure
sections 340.59" and 36491 govern the statute of limitations and com-
mencement of actions requirements pertaining to health care provid-
ers respectively. Section 340.5 provides for an extended statute of
limitations in medical malpractice cases beyond the one year statute
for conventional torts.9 6 Section 364 requires a medical malpractice
91. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980).
92. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1987).
93. Each section of MICRA incorporates the following definition of "health care
provider":
"Health care provider" means any person licensed or certified pursuant to Divi-
sion 2 (commencing with section 500) of the Business and Professions Code, or
licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initia-
tive Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with section 1440)
of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and any clinic, health dispensary,
or health facility, licensed pursuant to division 2 (commencing with section
1200) of the Health and Safety Code. "Health care provider" includes the le-
gal representatives of a health care provider.
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3333.1(c)(1), 3333.2(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987); CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 667.7(e)(3) (West 1980); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(2) (West Supp.
1987).
94. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982).
95. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 364 (West 1982).
96. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5. The purpose behind section 340.5 is to allowplaintiffs time to discover injuries that may not become apparent until years after the
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plaintiff to give a health care provider ninety days advance notice of
intention to commence action.9 7 Each section incorporates the defini-
tion of "health care provider" used in MICRA.98
Under the foregoing analysis, these statutes equally are inapplica-
ble to third party payors because they fall outside the definition of
"health care provider." Third party payors benefit by avoiding sec-
tion 340.5 because they fall under Code of Civil Procedure section
340,98 which favors defendants by providing a shorter statute of limi-
tations for tort actions. Third party payors, however, lose the advan-
tage of the ninety day advance notice of intention to commence ac-
tion required under section 364.
In either case, the disparate application of these statutes will com-
plicate the trial of multiple defendant medical malpractice actions in
which a third party payor is named. Although plaintiffs' attorneys
will be encouraged to name third party payors not protected by
MICRA, the potential application of a shortened statute of limita-
tions under section 340 may foreclose many claims.
The Continued Viability of Medi-Cal
Just as hospitals routinely are named in malpractice actions to en-
sure the existence of a "deep pocket," 00 so Medi-Cal will be named
whenever possible. Plaintiffs will attempt to tie Medi-Cal into the
causation chain to be assured of payment from the state if all other
defendants are judgment proof. This predictable flood of litigation
could result in consultants spending increased time away from their
jobs at depositions and trials, and could compromise the effective ad-
ministration of Medi-Cal.
The imposition of liability also may alter the decisional process of
Medi-Cal consultants. Given the consultant's distance from the pa-
tient and the constant threat of liability, development of more elabo-
rate means for consideration of treatment authorization requests
may be necessary. This could require more extensive documentation
by the treating physician, or direct communication between the
initial act of medical negligence. See Tressemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 663, 150
Cal. Rptr. 384, 387-88 (1978).
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364.
98. See supra note 94. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5(1) (West Supp. 1987);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(f)(1) (West 1982).
99. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340 (West Supp. 1987).
100. The "deep pocket rule" is a colloquial expression for the doctrine of joint and
several liability. See The Fair, Responsibility Act of 1986, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.1
(West Supp. 1987).
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treating physician and Medi-Cal consultant in each case. Either op-
tion could threaten the effective administration of the Medi-Cal sys-
tem in light of current budget constraints and consultant
workloads.' 0
Wickline also may cause consultants simply to approve more
treatment requests. Such a deferral to the judgment of treating phy-
sicians completely would protect Medi-Cal from liablity because no
treatment request would be denied. Such unlimited approval, how-
ever, also would constitute a return to a system of retrospective utili-
zation review and its attendant shortcomings.0 2
The imposition of third party payor liability impairs the funda-
mental purpose behind prospective utilization review and the Medi-
Cal Act's goal of providing adequate medical care to the indigent. 0 3
Before Wickline, limited funds were used to provide essential medi-
cal care where it was needed most. After Wickline, these funds ei-
ther may be diverted to increased administrative costs, or allocated
under a retrospective disbursement system until exhausted
prematurely.
Scope of Liability
The potential effect of Wickline is not limited to prospective utili-
zation review. Prospective utilization review is only one of several
cost containment mechanisms employed by third party payors of
health care services.' 0 4 At the national level, Medicare recently
switched to diagnosis-related groups (DRG's) in response to a con-
gressional mandate to develop a prospective rating system. 0 5 DRG's
establish a pre-set rate of reimbursement for treatment of given
medical conditions. 106 A similar program also has been adopted in
California, where contracting hospitals are paid an all-inclusive per
diem rate regardless of the actual costs of treatment to individual
patients.107
Under DRG-type systems, hospitals either lose money if the ac-
tual costs of treatment exceed the DRG reimbursement, or realize a
profit if treatment is completed for less than the DRG reimburse-
101. Telephone interview with Robert M. Bartel, M.D., Former Medical Director,
Computer Sciences Corporation, Medi-Cal Intermediary (Jan. 5, 1987).
102. Id.; See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
103. California Medical Association v. Brian, 30 Cal. App. 3d 637, 6442, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 555, 558 (1973).
104. See Note, supra note 16, at 1005.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1005-06.
107 . See generally Comment, California Negotiated Health Care: Implicationsfor Malpractice Liability, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 455 (1984); see also Peer Grouping
Hospitals, supra note 11.
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ment amount.108 The common feature of each of these systems is
that, like prospective review, the physician may be pressured to cur-
tail treatment or discharge the patient prematurely.10 9 The Wickline
court stated that, "it is essential that cost limitation programs not be
permitted to corrupt medical judgment."110 Because over half of all
physicians feel pressured by cost containment programs to under-
treat or release patients early, Wickline suggests that third party
payors may be exposed to an overwhelming degree of liability.111
Private third party payors are not beyond the scope of liability.
Recent California legislation authorizes private medical insurers to
utilize cost controls in contracting with health care providers.1 2 The
scope of potential third party payor liability established in Wickline
virtually is unlimited, and may profoundly impact the health care
industry.
THE EFFECT OF THIRD PARTY PAYOR LIABILITY ON PHYSICIANS
Because the ultimate concern of both the medical and legal sys-
tems is patient care, the most important aspect of third party payor
liability will be its effect on physicians. If holding third party payors
accountable for the results of their treatment authorization decisions
improves the overall quality of patient care, then the imposition of
such liability is best for all concerned.
Consider the example advanced by the court in Wickline. Suppose
that, following the Medi-Cal consultant's initial decision, Wickline's
treating physicians contacted the consultant and protested the denial
of the four additional days of hospitalization. The court suggests that
had Medi-Cal unreasonably ignored this protest, liability for any re-
sulting injury to Ms. Wickline would have shifted conclusively to the
state. 1 ' This implies that Ms. Wickline's physicians would have
108. See Note, supra note 16, at 1006.
109. See AM. MED. NEWS, supra note 2, at 17, quoting James H. Sammons, M.D.,
executive vice president of the American Medical Association:
Reimbursement of hospitals by Medicare is currently based on the diagnosis
related group (DRG) into which a patient's illness fits. This plan generally
provides a particular level of payment for all patients with one DRG, regard-
less of differences in length of hospital stay. Thus, there may be an economic
incentive for the hospital to limit the length of stay of any Medicare patient,
and physicians may feel some pressure to discharge Medicare patients as soon
as possible.
I10. Wickline, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1193, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
111. See Am. MED. NEws, supra note 2, at 17.
112. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10133, 10133.1, 11512 (West Supp. 1987).
113. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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been free to release her although fully cognizant of the attendant
risk, while pointing to Medi-Cal as the liability scapegoat for the
predictable injury.
Although such an analysis perhaps is logically appealing, it ig-
nores the basic purpose of any health care system: patient care. It is
inconceivable that a physician would stand by and allow a patient to
be injured foreseeably, regardless of the third party payor's ultimate
liability.
CONCLUSION
Medical cost containment mechanisms pressure physicians to un-
dertreat or release patients prematurely. Wickline suggests that third
party payors of health care benefits can be held accountable when
the negligent design or implementation of cost containment mecha-
nisms corrupts medical judgment and causes foreseeable injury. In
government sponsored health programs such as Medi-Cal, a thresh-
old question of governmental tort immunity exists. Although involv-
ing medical discretion, it seems unlikely that the decisional process
of a Medi-Cal consultant rises to the level of a quasi-legislative pol-
icy decision that would invoke discretionary immunity.
More important than the question of third party payor liability is
its potential impact on health care. Third party payors would receive
different statutory treatment from other medical malpractice defend-
ants. Although denied the protection of MICRA, third party payors
would benefit from a shorter statute of limitations than is usual for
medical malpractice actions. The imposition of liability also may
cause third party payors to abandon cost controls altogether, which
could lead to premature exhaustion of resources for medical care.
Because nearly half of all physicians feel pressured by cost con-
tainment mechanisms to release patients early, the scope of potential
third party payor liability could be enormous. Medical malpractice
plaintiffs will name both public and private third party payors wher-
ever possible to ensure the existence of a solvent defendant. This pre-
dictable excess of litigation may pose additional administrative
problems for third party payors, and channel scarce health care dol-
lars away from treatment into legal costs.
The bottom line is whether third party payor liability will improve
the overall quality of health care. This effect can be assessed only by
a prediction of the impact of third party payor liability on individual
physicians. Given a negligent and unreasonable denial of essential
treatment benefits by a third party payor, a physician has two
choices - either do nothing and allow foreseeable injury to the pa-
tient, or provide the essential treatment with little hope of payment.
Ethical and logical concerns support the second alternative as the
lesser of two evils.
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First, the very essence of health care stands for the proposition
that patient care always must come first, regardless of financial con-
siderations. This is particularly true in situations where predictable
injury can be prevented by appropriate intervention. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, it is the physician, not the third party
payor, who is closest to the patient and has the ability to prevent
such injury. It contravenes medical ethics and the fundamental na-
ture of the physician-patient relationship to suggest that a physician
can allow a patient to be foreseeably injured.
DORSETT MARC LYDE
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